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The Priority of U.S. Interests in the Establishment of Ukrainian Statehood (1990–1994)

Abstract. This article examines the priorities of U.S. interests in the establishment of Ukrainian statehood from 1990 to 1994, a topic of enduring relevance in the context of contemporary geopolitical challenges and Ukraine's role as a pivotal actor in Eastern Europe. The study challenges the misconception that U.S. policy toward Ukraine was solely focused on nuclear disarmament, revealing the multifaceted nature of American strategy. Drawing on an analysis of official documents and academic literature, the article elucidates how the United States supported Ukraine's sovereignty, promoted democratic reforms, fostered economic stabilization, and facilitated integration into the international security system. The significance of this research lies in the need to reassess historical aspects of Ukrainian-American relations to better understand Ukraine's contemporary role in countering Russian influence and strengthening regional security. The chronological scope spans from the adoption of Ukraine's Declaration of State Sovereignty in 1990 to the resignation of President Leonid Kravchuk in 1994. The study underscores Ukraine's strategic importance as a counterbalance to Russia's imperial ambitions, as reflected in the assessments of American and Ukrainian scholars, and highlights the importance of the U.S.'s comprehensive approach to supporting the development of Ukrainian statehood.

Keywords: Ukraine; United States of America; establishment of statehood; nuclear disarmament; international relations; treaties; geopolitics; trade; investment.

Introduction. The establishment of Ukrainian statehood from 1990 to 1994 unfolded amidst complex geopolitical transformations triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During this period, the United States played a pivotal role in shaping a new security architecture in Eastern Europe, where Ukraine, as a newly formed state, emerged as a significant actor. A common stereotype holds that the primary U.S. interest in Ukraine was confined to the issue of nuclear disarmament, driven by the aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, this perspective oversimplifies the multifaceted nature of American policy, which encompassed economic, political, and humanitarian support aimed at strengthening Ukraine's sovereignty, fostering its integration into the international system, and building a partnership with the United States.

Review of Sources and Literature. The analysis of U.S. interests in the establishment of Ukrainian statehood from 1990 to 1994 draws on a wide range of sources and literature, enabling a comprehensive exploration of the issue. The primary source base includes official documents available on the portal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, such as international treaties, agreements, memoranda, protocols, and statements concluded between Ukraine, the United States, and, in some cases, other states. These documents are crucial for understanding the multifaceted nature of American interests in the process of Ukrainian state-building and for debunking the widespread notion that U.S. policy toward Ukraine was solely focused on nuclear disarmament. For instance, agreements signed during President Leonid Kravchuk's 1992 visit to Washington highlight U.S. attention to humanitarian and social issues, particularly in the context of addressing the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

While nuclear disarmament was undoubtedly a significant component of U.S. policy, as evidenced by numerous agreements from 1993 to 1994 aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a systematic analysis of the treaty framework reveals that the nuclear issue was only one facet of a broader U.S. strategy. This strategy focused on supporting Ukraine's sovereignty, strengthening its position as an independent actor in international relations, and counterbalancing Russian influence in the region. Financial assistance amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars for denuclearization, economic reforms, and the conversion of the military-industrial complex underscores the comprehensive nature of U.S. engagement with Ukraine. Thus, the source base serves not only as a tool for reconstructing events but also as evidence of the multifaceted character of American interests in Eastern Europe.

The scholarly literature includes works by Ukrainian and international authors analyzing U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine in the context of the Soviet Union's dissolution and the establishment of Ukrainian statehood.

Among them, L.Chekalenko's studies [1; 2] stand out, as they explore the dilemmas of strategic partnership between Ukraine and the U.S., tracing the evolution of relations from cautious support to recognition of Ukraine as a key regional partner. Her claim that the U.S. restricted political and economic contacts until the ratification of key nuclear disarmament treaties is refuted in this article through an analysis of sources demonstrating active cooperation as early as 1992.

N.Korniienko's research [16] offers a periodization of U.S. policy toward Ukraine based on changes in presidential administrations, providing a clear framework for delineating the stages of bilateral relations. T.Kuzio [18] examines U.S. support for Ukraine during the Cold War and the early years of independence. O.Haran's work [13] focuses on the U.S. stance regarding the Soviet Union's dissolution and the recognition of Ukraine's independence, highlighting the cautious approach of the George H.W. Bush administration.

International scholars, such as J.Ellis [10] and E.Fishel [11], provide a broader geopolitical context, analyzing the «Ukrainian dilemma» and the impact of the «Moscow factor» on U.S. policy. Their works underscore the complexity of balancing support for Ukraine with the avoidance of confrontation with Russia. N.Frejek [12] emphasizes the role of perestroika and the failed 1991 coup as prerequisites for Ukraine's independence, aligning with S.Ploky's assessments [17], who stresses the consensus on the necessity of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament while drawing attention to the importance of the conditions and guarantees provided by the West.

R.Kharytonov's study [14] examines the international legal aspects of Ukraine-U.S. relations, highlighting the significance of the treaty framework in formalizing the partnership. S.Lyaskovets [19] focuses on trade and economic cooperation, illustrating the economic dimension of U.S. policy. Collectively, the utilized literature provides a multidimensional perspective on U.S. policy toward Ukraine, enabling both the reconstruction of historical events and their evaluation within a broader geopolitical context.

The aim of the article is to analyze the priorities of U.S. interests in the establishment of Ukrainian statehood from 1990 to 1994, with a focus on debunking the notion of a one-dimensional American policy. Through a systematic analysis of the treaty framework and scholarly literature, this study demonstrates that the United States pursued a comprehensive strategy, aimed not only at denuclearization but also at supporting democratic reforms, fostering economic stabilization, and countering Russian influence in the region, thereby underscoring Ukraine's strategic role in the new geopolitical reality of Eastern Europe.

Results and discussions. Following the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty on July 16, 1990, Ukraine remained part of the Soviet Union. In the view of the U.S. administration, the Soviet Union was still a cohesive entity, and it fully supported the political course of Mikhail Gorbachev. Nevertheless, the foundations of U.S.-Ukraine relations began to take shape before the proclamation of the Act of Independence on August 24, 1991, and prior to the official recognition of Ukraine's independence.

As the processes of «perestroika» deepened in 1990, during its third phase, the central authority of the USSR weakened to a critical point of no return. Its republics, including the Ukrainian SSR, gained varying degrees of autonomy and, while still part of the Union, began to play an independent role on the international stage. However, the United States, under President George H.W. Bush, continued to perceive the USSR as a unified subject of international relations and viewed Mikhail Gorbachev as a reliable leader [18, pp. 61-62]. N.Frejek argues that «had it not been for Gennady Yanayev's coup, the new union treaty, which had already been prepared, would have been signed on August 20, 1991. By that time, however, Ukraine had already chosen its own path» [12, p. 289].

While still part of the USSR, Ukraine became a signatory to the «Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe» [8] on November 19, 1990, and the «Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms» [4] (START-1) on July 31, 1991. After declaring independence, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified these treaties in 1992 and 1993, respectively. The resolution of military issues laid the groundwork for the development of a politico-legal framework between Ukraine and the United States of America.

N.Korniienko, in analyzing the periodization of Ukraine-U.S. relations, identifies two primary criteria: the tenures of Ukrainian and American presidents. This approach effectively elucidates all aspects of the bilateral relationship throughout the period of cooperation [16, p. 308]. However, since the focus of this study is exclusively on the establishment of Ukrainian statehood, the chronological boundaries are defined as follows: the lower limit is the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty in 1990, and the upper limit is the resignation of President Leonid Kravchuk on July 19, 1994. Following this period, the second convocation of the Verkhovna Rada and the election of the next President, Leonid Kuchma, marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of Ukrainian statehood.

In 1990–1991, U.S. policy toward the Ukrainian SSR was shaped by the desire to maintain stability in the post-Soviet space through support for Mikhail Gorbachev's reformist course and the avoidance of disintegration processes within the USSR [11, pp. 47–48]. The administration of George H.W. Bush prioritized a weakened but cohesive

Soviet Union, which allowed the United States to strengthen its influence within the bipolar system without undermining the architecture of global security. According to the U.S. National Security Strategy of 1990, Washington sought to integrate the Soviet Union into the global system as a partner, supporting its economic and political reforms. In this context, Ukraine was regarded as a secondary actor, and its aspirations for independence were perceived as a threat to stability. This perspective was reflected in George H.W. Bush's speech in Kyiv on August 1, 1991, known as the «Chicken Kyiv Speech» in which he cautioned against «suicidal nationalism» and urged support for a new union treaty [27, p. 92].

George H.W. Bush's speech was criticized in the United States as misinformed, though he had like-minded supporters among key allies. A year earlier, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had declared that she «could no more open a Ukrainian embassy than one in San Francisco» [26, p. 224].

In 1991, there was no consensus within the U.S. administration regarding events in the USSR. Secretary of State James Baker, while supporting Mikhail Gorbachev, deemed it necessary to preserve the Soviet Union, fearing an uncontrollable situation and regional conflicts involving nuclear weapons, akin to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and South Ossetia reinforced his belief that the collapse of the USSR could lead to chaos and the proliferation of nuclear materials from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Baker argued that Moscow's control over these territories was the correct approach. This position was shared by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs Thomas Niles, National Security Council member Condoleezza Rice, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, who were wary of a potential conflict between Ukraine and Russia over Crimea and Donbas [10, p. 256].

An opposing stance was taken by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and his deputies Paul Wolfowitz and Roman Popadiuk, who anticipated the imminent collapse of the USSR. They believed it was in the U.S.'s interest to support the independence of Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine, to create 15 new states in place of a single authoritarian one. Cheney advocated for dialogue with the republics and accelerating the USSR's dissolution, viewing Ukrainian independence as a strategic interest for the United States [27, p. 95].

The U.S. administration maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and adhered to international law even after Ukraine's independence referendum on December 1, 1991. Only Mikhail Gorbachev's official resignation as President on December 25, 1991, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR's declaration of its dissolution on December 26, 1991, enabled the U.S. to establish relations with seven former Soviet republics. The exchange of letters between the presidents of Ukraine and the United States on December 26, 1991, and January 3, 1992, formally established U.S. recognition of Ukrainian statehood [25]. However, this did not prevent a parliamentary delegation from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, led by Chairman Leonid Kravchuk, from visiting Washington in October 1991 [28].

Initially, the Russian factor compelled the United States to act cautiously to avoid destabilizing the post-Soviet space. This created a paradox: Ukraine was viewed as a key element in countering Russian influence, yet support for Ukraine was limited due to the necessity of cooperating with Russia. However, this situation was not static [3, p. 12].

The first official visit of President Leonid Kravchuk to the United States from May 5–11, 1992, marked Ukraine's attempt to move beyond the nuclear issue. The signing of a political declaration, a trade agreement, and a memorandum of understanding formalized the concept of a «democratic partnership». However, due to the Moscow-centric approach of the Bush administration, bilateral relations developed at a restrained pace [27, p. 97].

Nevertheless, over the course of two days – May 6 and 7, 1992 – seven agreements of a political, economic, and humanitarian nature were concluded. The statement on U.S.-Ukrainian relations laid the foundation for a strategic partnership between the two nations. Both parties agreed to promote free elections, the rule of law, and human rights. The U.S. Congress allocated \$400 million for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament [58]. The statement transcended mere diplomatic formality, outlining specific areas of cooperation. The United States committed to supporting Ukraine during its transitional period – from a totalitarian past to a democratic future.

The «Agreement on the Implementation of the U.S. Peace Corps Program in Ukraine» meticulously outlined the mechanism for deploying American volunteers to Ukraine to carry out tasks pre-agreed with the Ukrainian side. It provided for the training of volunteers by the U.S. government and guaranteed immunity from income taxation for volunteers and staff, as well as exemptions from customs duties on property imported for personal use [47]. These provisions underscored the U.S. administration's strategic intent to promote Ukraine's socio-economic development through non-governmental initiatives, fostering knowledge exchange, small business development, and the strengthening of local communities. The «Agreement on Humanitarian and Technical-Economic Cooperation», by granting exemptions from customs duties and taxes on goods and property related to U.S. assistance, as well as conferring a status equivalent to that of diplomatic personnel, highlighted the U.S.'s strategic aim to integrate Ukraine into the international system of humanitarian cooperation while maintaining oversight of resource utilization through verification and reimbursement mechanisms [52].

As S.Liaskovets notes, «the economic dimension is always present in the foreign policy strategy of the United States», a trend clearly evident in the «Agreement on Trade Relations between Ukraine and the United States of America» and the «Agreement on the Promotion of Investment» [19, p. 303]. The former eliminated barriers to trade and services and established principles of non-discriminatory market access, thereby opening the Ukrainian economy to American companies [55]. The latter, by granting the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) tax exemptions, provided a legal framework for protecting American investments while leaving disputes over the agreement's interpretation under arbitration jurisdiction, emphasizing the U.S. priority of safeguarding its economic interests during Ukraine's economic transformation [49].

The «Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection» defined areas of collaboration, such as combating pollution and radiation control, highlighting U.S. concerns in the early 1990s about addressing environmental challenges related to the Chernobyl disaster [50]. The «Memorandum of Understanding», though framework in nature, established principles for the unimpeded movement of diplomatic personnel, laying the institutional foundation for strengthening bilateral relations [23]. Together, these agreements formed a comprehensive U.S. approach to supporting Ukrainian statehood, with humanitarian, economic, and security components serving as instruments for achieving broader geopolitical objectives in Eastern Europe.

Only after coordinating the terms of the aforementioned areas of bilateral relations did the parties return to addressing military issues. On May 23, 1992, representatives of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States signed the so-called «Lisbon Protocol» [30], which resulted from the cessation of the USSR's existence as a subject of international relations.

It is worth emphasizing that there were disputes among Ukrainian politicians regarding control over nuclear weapons. A significant portion believed that retaining weapons of mass destruction could serve as a critical tool for ensuring national security. For instance, in November 1992, Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma announced an unwillingness to transfer strategic nuclear weapons to Russia, which heightened tensions in negotiations [13, p. 33]. However, historian Serhii Plokhyy aptly noted on this matter: «At that moment, even the staunchest opponents of this step in Ukraine criticized not the transfer of nuclear weapons itself, but the price offered by the West for their transfer – price in terms of both financial compensation and security guarantees. There was, in fact, a consensus that the weapons would have to be relinquished. The question was only on what terms» [17].

The phase of establishing bilateral relations during the tenure of George H.W. Bush concluded with the signing of a governmental agreement on shipping. This agreement established principles of equality, mutual benefit, and non-discriminatory access to ports and commercial organizations of both parties [56].

Following the election of Bill Clinton as president in 1993, the U.S. administration renewed its interest in Ukraine's military sphere, though it did not limit itself to this area. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, who visited Ukraine in April 1993, became convinced that Ukraine should be regarded as a sovereign state supported by the United States. During his visit to Kyiv that same year, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher proposed that Ukraine join NATO's Partnership for Peace program, which he viewed as a tactical element in ensuring the security of Central and Eastern European countries [1, pp. 123–124]. Special Advisor to the Secretary of State Strobe Talbott advocated shifting the focus from nuclear disarmament to a broader range of cooperative issues, which facilitated a deepening of political dialogue [61, p. 95].

On July 27, 1993, the intergovernmental «Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation in the Field of Defense and Military Relations» was signed. Notably, the parties did not address the issue of nuclear disarmament but focused on establishing the foundations for military rapprochement between Ukraine and the United States. The memorandum outlined plans for joint training of military personnel for peacekeeping missions, cooperation in topography, metrology, and hydrology, as well as regular visits by military officials from both sides. It also envisioned further expansion and deepening of relations [21]. In effect, the 1993 Memorandum marked Ukraine's first step toward a long-term process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system following the dissolution of the USSR.

A month later, on August 26, the «Memorandum of Understanding between the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and the U.S. Department of Justice on Cooperation in the Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals» was signed [20]. Given Ukraine's role in World War II, this agreement held somewhat greater significance for the Ukrainian side than for the American side. The seriousness of U.S. intentions to support the development of Ukrainian statehood was demonstrated by the U.S. Congress's approval of \$330 million in financial assistance to Ukraine under the Foreign Assistance Act. Of this amount, \$175 million was allocated for denuclearization, while \$155 million was designated for economic reforms [2, p. 104].

In the fall of 1993, the Bill Clinton administration returned to the nuclear issue. On October 25, three agreements were signed: one concerning assistance to Ukraine in eliminating strategic nuclear weapons and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [46]; another establishing the Ukrainian Science and Technology

Center; and a third addressing the enhancement of operational safety, risk reduction, and strengthening of regulatory systems for civilian nuclear facilities in Ukraine.

The 1993 agreement on assistance in eliminating nuclear weapons was merely a framework document, and its sudden signing demonstrates the United States' intent not to delay addressing this critical issue. The subsequent two agreements served as a concession to Ukraine for its compliance with the interests of the United States and other global actors on the international stage, as their content was humanitarian and security-focused. Ukraine, the United States, Canada, and Sweden established the Ukrainian Science and Technology Center to redirect scientists and engineers previously engaged in weapons development toward peaceful activities, thereby contributing to the resolution of national and international technical challenges and supporting the transition to a market economy [54]. In light of the tragic «Chornobyl experience», the United States committed to providing assistance in enhancing the operational safety of civilian nuclear energy facilities [51].

Drawing an interim conclusion, we categorically disagree with L.Chykalenko's assertion that «the United States openly blocked political and economic contacts with Ukraine until it ratified the START-1 Treaty, the Lisbon Protocol, and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons» [1, p. 123]. The first two agreements were ratified by the Verkhovna Rada on November 18, 1993, and the third on November 16, 1994 (entering into force on December 5, 1994). By the end of autumn 1993, the United States had signed 17 agreements with Ukraine, 11 of which expanded political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation, backed by substantial funding.

In December 1993, Ukraine and the United States signed a comprehensive package of agreements dedicated to the process of nuclear weapons elimination and related logistical and maintenance issues. On December 5, the parties agreed to provide Ukraine with \$2.26 million in free assistance to establish an export control system to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [41] and to supply material and technical resources, services, and relevant personnel training worth \$135 million at no cost [43].

On December 18, three agreements and one addendum were signed. It was necessary to establish a reliable, secure communication channel for exchanging information between Ukraine and the United States regarding nuclear disarmament control, a critical component of controlled non-proliferation guarantees. The United States provided Ukraine, free of charge, with computers, fax machines, printers, modems, satellite equipment, encryption materials, software, technical documentation, manuals, and spare parts valued at \$2.4 million. Two permanently staffed communication centers were established to transmit textual and graphical information via secure satellite channels. Messages from Ukraine to the United States were sent in Russian, while those from the United States to Ukraine were in English [44].

Additionally, the parties agreed to provide Ukraine with technical and financial assistance to establish and improve a state system for the control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials, amounting to \$7.5 million. Specialized working groups of technical experts were organized and equipped with computers, measuring instruments, and software [40]. To ensure safety during the transportation and elimination of nuclear warheads, the United States once again provided Ukraine, free of charge, with necessary equipment, personnel training, and technical manuals valued at \$5 million [45]. Finally, the parties agreed on the provisions of an addendum to the annex of the agreement on providing Ukraine with material and technical resources, outlining comprehensive support for the design and construction of key infrastructure facilities required for missile elimination [9].

Supporting the idea of integrating Ukraine into the global community, the Bill Clinton administration declared 1994 the «Year of Ukraine». The United States sought to promote democratic values and a market economy in Ukraine. President Clinton introduced the «Doctrine of Enlargement», which aimed to increase the number of democratic countries, as he believed they were more peaceful and friendly toward the United States. The significant interest in strengthening Ukraine also stemmed from its potential as a counterbalance to the new Russian federation [14, p. 84].

The first step in 1994 was the signing of the unexpected Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on January 14. Contrary to earlier carefully negotiated agreements, which envisioned a gradual denuclearization process, Leonid Kravchuk agreed to accelerate this process, prompting sharp criticism from the Verkhovna Rada and exacerbating a political crisis. On January 16, Ukraine acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968, and the NPT depositary states – the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom – provided declarative security assurances. Boris Yeltsin promised to compensate Ukraine for the cost of highly enriched uranium in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants, while Bill Clinton agreed to allocate \$175 million for the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the safe storage of fissile materials [39].

From March 1–4, 1994, a package of 12 agreements addressing economic and humanitarian issues was signed in Washington. On March 1, the parties agreed to expand trade in agricultural products and provide financing for the sale of these goods to Ukraine on preferential terms [5]. Additionally, the charter and functions of the Ukrainian-

American Joint Commission were developed to foster trade relations and investments. The Commission was a bilateral intergovernmental body that served as a forum for coordinating cooperation [31].

On March 4, the Ukrainian and American sides reached an agreement on ten additional arrangements. Following the establishment of the Joint Commission's charter the previous day, the next step was the signing of a joint statement on its creation. The Commission consisted of two sections – Ukrainian and American – each led by its own chair. Its work was overseen by an Executive Board with two co-chairs, while operational activities were managed by Executive Secretaries [37].

In analyzing economic and trade relations in 1994, the U.S. Department of State highlighted several serious issues in Ukraine: an imperfect banking system, underdeveloped market legislation, high taxes, and corruption. However, among the positive developments, the advancement of legislation to protect intellectual property rights was noted [19, p. 304].

Despite numerous significant obstacles, these challenges did not deter U.S. economic interests in Ukraine. The Convention on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital of Individuals and Legal Entities Residing in Ukraine and the United States was signed. Its primary objective was to eliminate situations where the same income or capital was taxed in both countries and to prevent tax evasion [15]. Additionally, a Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Field of Economy and Trade was issued. This document lacked specific commitments and primarily outlined areas of cooperation. Nevertheless, the United States granted Ukraine benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences in March 1994, enabling duty-free exports of approximately 4,400 types of Ukrainian products to the American market, significantly boosting Ukrainian exports [36].

The Ukrainian and American sides agreed on provisions to encourage and mutually protect investments. Internationally recognized standards of protection were established, including national treatment, protection against expropriation, freedom of capital transfer, and effective dispute resolution mechanisms. As a result, a predictable and secure environment for investors was created [6].

The agricultural sector was not overlooked. A joint statement outlined plans for privatization, the transition to a market economy, the establishment of farmers' cooperatives, and the development of credit systems [34]. The U.S. Department of Agriculture agreed to provide Ukraine with expertise in the agricultural sector. The American side committed to supplying one qualified Agricultural Advisor to work with Ukraine's Ministry, covering their salary, relocation, and housing expenses [59].

Building on the provisions of the Agreement on Enhancing the Operational Safety of Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine, the General Principles for Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Reactors were signed. These principles provided for continued joint research on the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Both countries committed to supporting the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to working toward the prompt establishment of an International Convention on Nuclear Safety [57].

Significant attention was devoted to the development of culture and science. The parties signed an intergovernmental «Agreement on the Protection and Preservation of Cultural Heritage», which led to the creation of the «Joint Commission on Cultural Heritage». The agreement guaranteed a non-discriminatory approach and the protection of the heritage of all national, religious, or ethnic groups within each country's territory [48]. Following the establishment of the Ukrainian Science and Technology Center in 1993, cooperation in science and technology was expanded through a new 1994 Treaty. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the exchange of scientific and technical information and experts, joint research, and seminars became unrestricted, and issues related to intellectual property were addressed [7].

The culmination of this productive meeting was the Joint Statement on the Development of Friendship and Partnership between Ukraine and the United States of America. Leonid Kravchuk and Bill Clinton proclaimed the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations, grounded in partnership, mutual trust, and respect. The United States reiterated its security assurances to Ukraine. The American government fulfilled Bill Clinton's promise by committing to provide \$175 million in assistance for nuclear weapons reduction and an additional \$350 million in economic aid to support Ukraine's transition to a market economy and democratic society. Bill Clinton also expressed support for Ukraine's aspiration to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) [35].

The treaty process in March 1994 did not conclude. The parties returned to the issue of Ukraine's denuclearization. On March 21 in Kyiv, a governmental Agreement on the Conversion of Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) Enterprises was signed. The United States committed to providing up to \$40 million in assistance for the reorientation of the MIC and military technologies, the retraining of military personnel, and the conversion of military facilities for civilian use [42]. Additionally, an amendment to the Agreement on the Development of a State System for the Control, Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, originally signed on December 18, 1993, was signed, increasing financial assistance from \$7.5 million to \$12.5 million [29]. The

culmination was a Joint Statement by Ukraine's Minister of Defense Vitaliy Radetsky and U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry on the conversion of the specialized military-construction industry, capable of building housing for discharged military personnel, funded by the United States in the amount of \$20 million [33].

On May 13, 1994, in Washington, a Memorandum was signed between the governments of Ukraine and the United States, formalizing their joint commitment to preventing the proliferation of missile equipment and technologies that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction [22]. On the same day, the U.S. Cabinet issued a Statement welcoming Ukraine's accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of 1987 [60]. A Joint Statement was also released, affirming Ukraine's right to develop missile technologies for use in the space industry [38].

On May 28, in Kyiv, with the aim of integrating Ukraine's technical standards into the global system, an Agreement on Standardization, Metrology, and Certification was signed. Ukraine gained access to American national standards (ANSI), while the United States gained access to Ukrainian standards, which were based on the Soviet GOST system. Both parties also agreed to promote the enhanced role of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in improving international standardization activities [53]. To reinforce and expand this Agreement, Ukraine and the United States signed a Memorandum on Expanding Cooperation in the Fields of Standardization, Metrology, and Chemical, Physical, and Engineering Metrology [24].

The United States administration repeatedly demonstrated initiative in supporting the development of Ukrainian statehood. In the 1990s, the U.S. government launched several initiatives to promote democratic reforms and the transition of the economies of newly independent states to market principles. These included the Enterprise Support Fund for Newly Independent States, the Eurasia Foundation, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's COHRAN program. Additionally, the American Entrepreneurship Fund supported a lending program for small business development, which was also active in Ukraine [19].

The Clinton Democrats effectively inherited the course set by the Bush Republicans and remained consistent in supporting the establishment of Ukrainian statehood. Ukraine was viewed by the United States as a key element in the new security architecture of Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the USSR. Zbigniew Brzezinski, an American geostrategist, emphasized that an independent Ukraine serves as a barrier to the restoration of Russian imperial policy, as its existence weakens Russia's potential as a dominant regional power [32].

Conclusions and prospects for further research. The analysis of the priorities of the United States' interests in the process of Ukraine's state-building from 1990 to 1994 demonstrates that American policy was comprehensive and extended far beyond the issue of nuclear disarmament. While Ukraine's denuclearization, driven by the U.S. desire to ensure global security, was a significant component, it constituted only a part of a broader geopolitical strategy. Based on the systematization of source materials, it has been established that the United States provided Ukraine with approximately \$1.47 billion in financial assistance, of which \$967.16 million was allocated for nuclear disarmament, conversion of the military-industrial complex, and nuclear materials security, while \$505 million was directed toward the transition to a market economy and democratic reforms. These funds, alongside political and humanitarian initiatives such as the Peace Corps program and support for mitigating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, underscore the multifaceted nature of U.S. policy aimed at strengthening Ukraine's sovereignty, integrating it into the international system, and countering Russia's imperial potential, aligning with Zbigniew Brzezinski's assessments of Ukraine's geopolitical role as a barrier to Russia.

The evolution of U.S. policy from cautious support for the USSR under the George H.W. Bush administration to active partnership with Ukraine under Bill Clinton reflects Washington's adaptation to post-Soviet realities. The initial Moscow-centric approach, exemplified by George H.W. Bush's 1991 speech in Kyiv, gave way to recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign partner, formalized through a series of bilateral agreements and financial support. The Trilateral Statement of 1994 between the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia marked the culmination of this process, linking denuclearization with declarative security guarantees, which, despite criticism in Ukraine, facilitated the country's integration into the international security system.

The financial assistance provided over four years for economic and democratic reforms, amounting to one-third of the total aid, can be considered significant. Nuclear security in Eastern Europe was indeed the top priority among U.S. interests, but it was not an end in itself for the American administration. In financial terms, it accounted for two-thirds of the aid, but in diplomatic terms, the proportions are reversed: 17 (38.6%) agreements related to nuclear disarmament and 27 (61.4%) agreements on non-military cooperation between Ukraine and the United States, with the economic sphere being predominant.

Prospects for further research encompass several directions. First, it is advisable to examine in greater detail the influence of individual American policymakers, such as Dick Cheney or Strobe Talbott, on shaping U.S. policy toward Ukraine to better understand the internal mechanisms of decision-making. Second, it is worth investigating how American financial assistance impacted Ukraine's domestic political processes, particularly the establishment of

democratic institutions and a market economy. Third, a comparative analysis of U.S. policy toward Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, such as Belarus or Kazakhstan, would help identify the uniqueness of the Ukrainian case. Finally, the current context of Russian aggression against Ukraine underscores the need to reassess the events of 1990–1994, particularly the effectiveness of the security guarantees provided, to evaluate their significance in contemporary geopolitics. Such studies will contribute to a deeper understanding of the historical foundations of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States and its role in ensuring regional stability.

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Погуляєв О.

Пріоритет інтересів США в становленні державності України в 1990–1994 роках

Анотація. Стаття присвячена аналізу пріоритетів інтересів Сполучених Штатів Америки у процесі становлення державності України в 1990–1994 роках, що є актуальним у контексті сучасних геополітичних викликів та ролі України як ключового суб'єкта в Східній Європі. Дослідження спростовує міф про те, що американська політика щодо України обмежувалася лише питанням ядерного роззброєння, демонструючи багатогранність стратегії США. На основі аналізу офіційних документів і академічної літератури стаття розкриває, як США підтримували суверенітет України, сприяли демократичним реформам, економічній стабілізації та інтеграції до міжнародної системи безпеки. Актуальність роботи зумовлена необхідністю переосмислення історичних аспектів українсько-американських відносин для розуміння сучасної ролі України в протидії російському впливу та зміцненні регіональної безпеки. Хронологічні межі охоплюють період від прийняття Декларації про державний суверенітет України (1990) до відставки Президента Леоніда Кравчука (1994). Дослідження підкреслює стратегічне значення України як противаги російському імперському потенціалу, що відображено в оцінках американських і українських дослідників, та акцентує на важливості комплексного підходу США до розбудови української державності.

Ключові слова: Україна; Сполучені Штати Америки; становлення державності; ядерне роззброєння; міжнародні відносини; договори; геополітика; торгівля; інвестиції.

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